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Vulnerable Insiders: 
Constitutional Design, International Law, and 
the Victims of Internal Armed Conflict in 
Colombia 
 
DAVID LANDAU*  
 
This article, prepared for a conference on “The External Dimensions of 
Constitutions” held at the University of Cambridge in September 2016, explains how 
the Colombian Constitutional Court constructed a set of rights for a group of vulnerable 
insiders—victims of the country’s long-running internal armed conflict. The Court based 
its jurisprudence on a 1991 constitutional design that turned towards international law 
as a way of resolving a severe domestic crisis of violence and legitimacy. The Court has 
drawn heavily on principles of international human rights law and international 
humanitarian law to develop a set of protections for Colombia’s massive population of 
internally displaced persons, as well as to protect the rights of victims to receive adequate 
access to truth, justice, and reparations during peace processes with illegal armed groups. 
The Court has generally developed a model of intervention that emphasizes the rights of 
victims while preserving flexibility for the state in order to avoid disruption of delicate peace 
processes. It has also successfully drawn on a logic of solidarity that identifies victims as 
deserving and overlooked recipients of aid by the Colombian state. This very logic may 
identify a potential limit of the model: a strategy based on solidarity may successfully 
incorporate overlooked insiders, such as internally displaced persons, but it is unclear 
whether it will prove as successful with outsiders such as cross-border refugees.  
                                                             
* Mason Ladd Professor and Associate Dean for International Programs, Florida State University 
College of Law  My gratitude goes to Mila Versteeg, Eyal Benvenisti, and the The Lauterpacht Centre 
for International Law at the University of Cambridge for holding the conference for which this draft 
was written, and to the participants at that conference for comments that immensely improved the 
draft  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Much work has focused on the conditions under which domestic 
constitutional law will provide international law protections for migrants 
and other “outsiders.” This article uses the example of the Colombian 
Constitutional Court to examine an important variation on this trend: the 
use of these constructs of international law to protect victims of the 
country’s long-running internal armed conflict. 
Part I locates the origin of the internationalization of Colombian 
constitutional law at the politics of the Constituent Assembly of 1991, and 
particularly the sense of the President and key members of the Assembly 
that the country’s international and domestic public image had suffered 
because of frequent crises of order and the draconian emergency measures 
intended to restore it. The domestic political class believed restoring the 
government’s reputation would require an explicit declaration to signal 
Colombia would now play by the rules of a “good” state. The Constituent 
Assembly thus passed a series of reforms intended to tether Colombian 
constitutionalism more strongly to international standards. These included 
provisions giving international law a high status in the constitutional order 
and others specifically granting benefits under international law to defined 
groups, such as the inclusion of a constitutional right to asylum. Colombian 
constitutionalism thus turned outwards as a way to deal with a series of 
intractable internal crises. 
Part II shows how the Constitutional Court used these provisions to 
build a muscular set of protections for the country’s massive number of 
victims of internal armed conflict. The construction of victims of armed 
conflict as a protected class has been one of the central achievements of the 
Court and has had significant impact on both public policy and the ongoing 
peace processes. For example, the Court issued large-scale structural 
remedies that forced the state to provide more assistance to the country’s 
large population of internally displaced persons. This remedy drew heavily 
from international standards and guidelines while incorporating protections 
traditionally found in Colombian constitutional law. The Court has also 
drawn heavily from international humanitarian law in constructing the rights 
of victims to learn the truth about what happened to them, to get justice for 
crimes committed against them, and to receive reparations, either from 
wrongdoers or the state itself, for those acts. It has used these standards to 
shape the peace process, first with paramilitaries, and now with the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrilla group, in order 
to ensure that those processes do not disregard the interests of victims. 
In effect, the Court has used a set of international principles to define 
and protect a population of insiders who have often been rendered invisible 
by existing public policy. Invocations of international law have helped give 
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more authority to the Court’s project. At the same time, the Court has 
preferred a relatively flexible approach, which incorporates international law 
as a fairly ambiguous set of standards. The goal is to require the state to 
account for vulnerable groups, rather than requiring that it adopt any 
particular stance with respect to those groups. Such an approach—
emphasizing a flexible but robust vision of international law—may be useful 
for other courts facing crises involving internally-displaced persons or 
refugees. 
Part III explores both the promise and limits of the Colombian 
Constitutional Court’s strategy. It shows that the Court has successfully 
drawn on a logic of solidarity to increase inclusion rather than exclusion of 
the vulnerable groups it has sought to aid, and moreover that it has generally 
used careful and flexible strategies of intervention that have provided 
important input into the peace process without threatening it. However, it 
is less clear whether the logic of using international law to protect a 
vulnerable group of insiders such as internally displaced persons (IDPs) will 
carry over to true outsiders such as asylum seekers; social and political 
groups may experience solidarity with the former but not the latter. Indeed, 
recent Colombian experience offers some support for such a position. 
Despite the extensive jurisprudence on IDPs, the 1991 Constitution’s right 
of asylum is one of the less developed rights provisions in the text, and 
overall the Court has developed a relatively deferential analysis to the rights 
of foreigners. The Court’s recent reaction to migration related to the 
Venezuelan crisis illustrates the ambiguities inherent in seeking to extend 
IDP jurisprudence to a group of “outsiders.”  As Part IV concludes, it is 
thus unclear whether the Colombian approach offers a viable strategy for 
courts or actors confronting a refugee crisis that crosses national 
boundaries. 
 
 II. INTERNATIONALIZATION FOR INTERNAL PURPOSES: THE 
COLOMBIAN CONSTITUTION OF 1991 
 
The dominant ethos of the Constituent Assembly of 1991 was the need 
to respond to the country’s long-running internal armed conflict. The 
Assembly itself was sparked by a sense of institutional crisis and inability to 
effect needed changes in order to respond to that crisis: what some analysts 
called a “blocked society.”1 The inability to change carried with it the cost 
of increasingly high levels of political and social violence in the country. In 
1985, for example, the country’s Supreme Court was stormed by a guerrilla 
group (the M-19), and a military operation to reclaim the building ended in 
                                                             
1 See Fernando Cepeda Ulloa, Colombia: The Governability Crisis, in CONSTRUCTING DEMOCRATIC 
GOVERNANCE IN LATIN AMERICA 193, 196–97 (Jorge I  Dominguez & Michael Shifter, eds , 2d ed  
2003)  
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the death of about half the justices on the Court.2 In 1989, the Liberal 
presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galán was assassinated as part of a string 
of political killings and is viewed as the catalyst for the student movement 
that would eventually culminate, after several presidential decrees, 
referendums, and Supreme Court decisions, in the Constituent Assembly.3 
The Assembly itself was elected through a form of proportional 
representation that included a large number of different political 
movements, some of whom were newcomers to the political systems. The 
Assembly included representatives of several different, demobilized guerrilla 
groups including the M-19, which represented the second-largest political 
party in the Assembly.4 The inclusion of these groups and other 
traditionally-excluded actors, such as indigenous groups, in addition to the 
country’s traditional parties, was a core part of the Assembly’s legitimacy. 
In order to deal with the internal conflict prior to the drafting of the 
1991 Constitution, Colombian presidents had increasingly turned towards 
“states of exception,” a term used to describe utilizing emergency as the 
major tool to govern and maintain social order.5 This state of exception is 
particularly evident in the instrument found in the 1886 Constitution called 
the “state of siege,” which could be called unilaterally by the president for a 
broad set of purposes related to public order.6 Indeed, Colombia lived under 
a state of exception almost all of the time in the 1970s and 1980s.7 Using 
these devices, the president rather than the Congress issued most major 
pieces of legislation. Presidents also used these advantages to limit or 
suspend basic rights, such as the right to a civil trial, and to create new crimes 
related to national security concerns, practices with which the judiciary rarely 
interfered.8 
Concern about the state of siege was one of the core issues at the 1991 
Constituent Assembly. The device had come to be seen as emblematic of 
the total failure of the Colombian state to contend with the threat of 
violence and establish peace.9 Many delegates to the Assembly, as well as 
President Cesar Gaviria, argued that the state of siege encouraged repression 
by allowing executive officials to carry out arbitrary acts in an unrestrained 
way. At the same time, they argued that the instrument allowed “the worst 
                                                             
2 See Manuel Jose Cepeda-Espinosa, Judicial Activism in a Violent Context: The Origin, Role, and Impact 
of the Colombian Constitutional Court, 3 WASH  U  GLOBAL STUD  L  REV  529, 549 (2004)  
3 See Cepeda Ulloa, supra note 1, at 197  
4 See Renata Segura & Ana Maria Bejarano, ¡Ni una asamblea más sin nosotros! Exclusion, Inclusion, 
and the Politics of Constitution-Making in the Andes, 11 CONSTELLATIONS 217, 220 tbl 1 (2004)  
5 See Rodrigo Uprimny, The Constitutional Court and Control of Presidential Extraordinary Powers in 
Colombia, 10 Democratization 46 (2003)  
6 See id. 
7 See id. at 65 tbl 3  
8 See id. at 51  
9 See Antonio Barreto Rozo, LA GENERACION DEL ESTADO DE SITIO: EL JUICIO A LA 
ANORMALIDAD INSTITUCIONAL EN LA ASAMBLEA NACIONAL CONSTITUYENTE DE 1991 (2011)  
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of both worlds” because it had proven ineffective—it was used in an 
increasingly chronic way without any discernible improvement in the 
security situation.10 Those around the Assembly were also concerned that 
the frequent resort to states of exception had worsened the image of the 
country internationally. In his address opening the Assembly, President 
Gaviria stated that the state of siege had “harmed the prestige of our 
democracy.”11 In a subsequent address, he elaborated on this theme as 
follows:  
 
While Colombians want to overcome an institutional deficit at all 
costs, in the exterior it is thought that our state is so weak that we 
live in a permanent state of martial law. Our democracy is 
discredited before international opinion by the distorted image of a 
powerful state of siege.12 
 
The government and Assembly’s solution to this problem was to create 
a greater and more effective set of regulations on the use of states of 
exception.13 They were maintained in the new constitutional text—the crisis 
of public order that spurred the calling of the Constituent Assembly virtually 
guaranteed that this would be the case. But the Assembly sought to 
rejuvenate ordinary institutions like the Congress in order to make the 
invocation of emergency powers less frequent. The thought was that many 
situations previously dealt with by the executive calling a state of exception 
could now be dealt with by ordinary powers. Moreover, it created a number 
of new limitations and regulations on the states of emergency found in the 
new constitutional text, particularly the “state of internal commotion” 
designed to deal with threats related to the internal armed conflict.14 
The richest set of new limitations were those that tied Colombian 
constitutional law to international legal standards, particularly during states 
of exception. One revised constitutional article states that norms of 
international humanitarian law must be observed “in all cases” during states 
of exception.15 The Colombian Constitutional Court since 1991 has been 
vigilant in policing the boundaries of states of exception, and thus the 
percentage of the time that the Court is under a state of exception decreased 
                                                             
10 See Speech of the President of the Republic, Doctor Cesar Gaviria Trujillo, at the Installation 
of the National Constituent Assembly, Feb  5, 1991, in MANUEL JOSE CEPEDA, INTRODUCCION A LA 
CONSTITUCION DE 1991: HACIA UN NUEVO CONSTITUCIONALISMO 313, 324 (1993)  
11 Id. 
12 See Speech of the President of the Republic, Doctor Cesar Gaviria Trujillo, before the “General 
Santander” School of Police Cadets, May 16, 1991, in id. at 425, 426  
13 See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C P ] arts  212–15  
14 See id. art  213  
15 See id  art  214, cl  2  
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very sharply after 1991.16 No state of internal commotion has been 
successfully invoked since 2002.17 Thus, the 1991 constitution changed the 
way the country governed itself during periods of crisis and conflict, making 
legal states of exception far less frequent. 
Beyond the key issue of states of exception, much of the 1991 
Constitution adopted an orientation that was designed to achieve peace and 
to make the Colombian state’s actions more consistent with those of 
supposedly “normal” democracies. The new Constitution establishes peace 
as both a right and a duty.18 Constitutional designers also created a much 
more extensive set of constitutional rights than those that had been found 
in the Constitution of 1886. For example, the new constitution included 
references to human dignity, such as those found in the German Basic Law, 
and a long list of socioeconomic rights.19  
Additionally, the designers created a new, and quite powerful, 
Constitutional Court charged exclusively with protecting the Constitution. 
It maintained an existing instrument called the public action, which allowed 
any citizen to challenge any law in front of the Constitutional Court at any 
time on abstract review.20 It also gave citizens the ability to rapidly and easily 
challenge the actions of governmental (and, in limited instances, non-
governmental) actors that violated constitutional rights by filing a form of 
individual complaint called the tutela. Citizens can file tutelas without the 
assistance of a lawyer, and the designers mandated that judicial decisions 
had to be made within ten days of filing at each level of the judiciary.21 
Furthermore, the new constitution created a large number of non-judicial 
“checking” institutions to monitor and correct the actions of state officials. 
Some of these institutions, such as the Defensoria del Pueblo (or National 
Ombudsperson) and Procuraduria General de la Nacion (or National Inspector 
General) were charged specifically with the protection of human rights.22 
The constitution also explicitly reframed the relationship between 
domestic and international law, giving international human rights law a 
status essentially equal to—and in some cases above—the 1991 
Constitution itself. Article 93 provides that the constitution must be 
interpreted in light of international human rights treaties ratified by 
Colombia, and furthermore that “international treaties and agreements 
                                                             
16 See Uprimny, supra note 5, at 65 tbl 3 (showing that Colombia was under a state of exception 
82 percent of the time between 1970 and 1991 but only 17 5 percent of the time between 1991 and 
2002)  
17 See Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], octubre 12, 2002, Sentencia C-802/02 
(upholding a state of internal commotion declared shortly after President Alvaro Uribe’s inauguration)  
18 See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C P ] art  22 (“Peace is a right and a duty whose 
compliance is mandatory ”)  
19 See id  arts  1 (dignity), 42–77 (socioeconomic rights), 79–82 (environmental rights)  
20 See id. art  241(4)  
21 See id  art  86  
22 See id. art  277, cl  2 (National Inspector General); art  282 (National Ombudsperson)  
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ratified by Congress that recognize human rights and prohibit their 
limitation in states of emergency shall prevail domestically.”23 This latter 
provision again demonstrates the centrality of states of exception to the 
1991 Constitution, and the overriding desire of constitutional designers to 
ensure that government actions during emergencies complied with core 
international standards. 
Article 93 can be read as part of a broader global tradition within 
comparative constitutional law which relies upon international law to 
interpret domestic law.24 Countries place these provisions in their 
constitutional orders for a variety of reasons. But, their particular salience in 
Colombia was tied to concerns about the problematic actions of the 
Colombian state during the internal armed conflict, especially during states 
of exception. Article 93 served as a signal to both the Colombian population 
and the rest of the world that Colombia would move from being seen as a 
troubled, violent, and repressive democracy to being a country that 
embraced regional and international norms. 
Based largely on article 93, the Colombian Constitutional Court has 
created the concept of a “constitutional block.”25 Under this concept as 
interpreted by the Court, the constitution includes not only domestic 
provisions, but also core provisions of international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law (both treaty and custom-based).26 The Court 
has used these provisions to limit emergency decrees and legislation dealing 
with problems of public order during periods of normality and states of 
emergency. The constitutional block “in a broad sense” includes provisions 
of international human rights treaties ratified by Colombia, as well as certain 
other international law instruments and pieces of legislation. These 
provisions must be considered when interpreting the 1991 Constitution.27 
The constitutional block “in a strict sense” consists of those provisions of 
international human rights treaties that cannot be derogated or limited 
during states of exception; these provisions actually have a supra-
constitutional status because they “prevail” over all other elements of the 
Colombian legal order.28 
The interpretations of human rights treaties by authorized interpreters 
like the Inter-American Court of Human Rights or the commissions set up 
                                                             
23 See id. art  93  
24 See generally Vicki C  Jackson, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA 
(2010)  
25 See Carlos Bernal Pulido, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments in the Case Study of Colombia: 
An Analysis of the Justification and Meaning of the Constitutional Replacement Doctrine, 11 Int’l J  Const  L  339, 
343 (2013)  
26 See id. 
27 See, e.g., Monica Arango Olaya, El Bloque de Constitucionalidad en la jurisprudencia de la Corte 
Constitucional Colombiana, PRECEDENTE 2004, at 79, 85, available at 
http://www icesi edu co/contenido/pdfs/C1C-marango-bloque pdf  
28 See id. at 84  
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under regional or international instruments are not formally part of the 
constitutional block, but the Court has held that they are entitled to great 
weight as interpretive aids for the meaning of international law.29 The Court 
also regularly has referred to “soft law” instruments such as guidelines or 
declarations, again as an interpretive aid.30 Finally, the Court has routinely 
referred to customary international law as well as treaty-based law, 
particularly when drawing out the implications of international humanitarian 
law.31 In short, the Colombian Constitutional Court has used article 93 and 
other constitutional provisions as the foundation for a highly 
internationalized constitutional jurisprudence. 
Finally, the Colombian Constitution of 1991 includes a fairly generous 
set of rights for outsiders. Perhaps most striking among these is article 36, 
providing that, “the right to asylum is recognized within the limits provided 
by law.”32 This provision is bolstered by others which give aliens access to 
the same civil, but not political, rights as Colombian citizens33 and protects 
them from extradition for political reasons.34 The older 1886 Constitution 
was not silent on the rights of aliens—it contained a provision generally 
entitling them to equality in civil rights35—but the new text is considerably 
more expansive. In part, the Assembly reflected a broader regional tradition 
of recognizing the rights of aliens within Latin America by passing the 
provision. The right and practice of asylum have a long and sometimes 
troubled history within Colombia36 and in Latin America more generally. 
Commentators have noted the phenomenon is distinct from the rights of 
refugees, although closely related.37 The Assembly’s decisions here too 
                                                             
29 See, e.g., Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], agosto 5, 2010, T-616/10, § II 2 2 4 
(“[T]he observations and recommendations offered by the organs authorized to interpret international 
human rights treaties ratified by Colombia are relevant for clarifying the normative content of their 
dispositions and the meaning of the fundamental rights consecrated in the Constitution  Even though 
these documents are not automatically incorporated into the constitutional block, they do constitute a 
relevant hermeneutic criterion and a limit for the legislator ”)  
30 A prominent relevant example is Decision T-025/04, which declared a state of 
unconstitutional conditions for internal forced displacement and referred extensively to the Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement produced by the United Nations Higher Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR)  Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], enero 22, 2004, Sentencia T-
025/04  This decision and its incorporation of international law are considered in more detail in Part 
III  A infra  
31 See, e.g., Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], abril 25, 2007, Sentencia C-291/07 
(considering the constitutionality of a number of criminal law provisions bearing on the internal armed 
conflict)  
32 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C P ] art  36  
33 See id. art  35  
34 See id. art  100  
35 CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA DE 1886 art  11  
36 See, e.g., Asylum Case (Colom  v  Peru), Judgement, 1950 I C J  Rep  6 (holding that Peru did 
not have to recognize a grant of political asylum offered by the Colombian ambassador in Peru to a 
Peruvian politician)  
37 See, e.g., Discussion Document UNHCR November 2004, The Refugee Situation in Latin America: 
Protection and Solutions Based on the Pragmatic Approach of the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees of 1984, 18 
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seemed to respond to an increased desire to make Colombian constitutional 
law line up better with international legal standards. Yet the trajectory of 
these rights, as explained below, has been somewhat different than those 
aimed at internal actors. Despite the right of asylum’s expansion in the 1991 
Constitution, it remains to be one of the less developed rights in the 1991 
Constitution. 
 
 III. THE JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF RIGHTS FOR THE VICTIMS OF 
INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT 
 
In the Constitutional Court’s hands, these provisions have had a 
significant impact on the shape of the internal armed conflict. As noted 
above, for example, the Court has used the 1991 Constitution to exercise 
much greater control over states of exception and the exercise of executive 
power more generally. For our purposes, the key development is the way 
that the Court used the “internationalized” orientation of the 1991 
Colombian constitution to build up a body of law to protect victims of the 
internal conflict. Before the Court began acting in this area, Colombian 
public policy largely lacked provisions to aid these victims, identify them, or 
account for their interests. Colombian politics often treated actors affected 
by the conflict as invisible. The Court’s main achievement, in this sense, has 
been to inject a discourse about the rights of victims into the political sphere. 
 
A. The Rights of Internally Displaced Persons 
 
One of the most important lines of Constitutional Court jurisprudence 
was aimed at constructing a set of protections for internally displaced 
persons (IDPs). The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
found that Colombia had 6.9 million IDPs at the end of 2015 (out of a total 
national population of less than fifty million). This is the highest number of 
IDPs in the world, exceeding even extremely troubled countries like Iraq 
and Syria.38 These IDPs have been displaced over many years by both left-
wing guerrillas and right-wing paramilitaries. Many have been displaced 
                                                             
INT’L J  REFUGEE L  252, 257 n  15 (2006)  Several other countries in the region have either a right to 
asylum or mention the practice of asylum as a guiding principle of international relations  The 
constitution of Honduras creates a right to asylum, see CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE 1982 art  101 
(Hond ) (“Honduras recognizes the right of asylum in the form and conditions established by law ”), 
while the constitution of Costa Rica states that the country shall be an “asylum” for anyone persecuted 
for political reasons, see CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE COSTA RICA, art  31, and the 
Constitution of Brazil states “the concession of asylum” as a governing principle of the country’s 
foreign relations, see CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C F ][Constitution] art  4 (Braz )  Both the Honduran 
and Costa Rican constitutions also include a non-refoulement principle—individuals cannot be sent 
back to a country where their lives would be in danger  
38 UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR), GLOBAL TRENDS: 
FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN 2015, 57 tbl 1 (2016), available at http://www unhcr org/576408cd7  
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from rural areas and ended up living in precarious conditions in Colombia’s 
largest cities. The causes of internal displacement are complex and often 
rooted in both politics and economics, but the underlying causes usually 
stem from “illegal armed groups and their actions against civilians.”39 
Colombia also has a net outflow of refugees to other countries, although the 
scope of this population is considerably smaller than the massive number of 
IDPs.40 The internal displacement problem in Colombia has thus been 
called “one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world.”41 
The size of this population was already very large in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, but there was at that time no coherent state policy to attend to 
the IDPs.42 The Court began deciding a large number of tutelas filed by 
individuals or small groups of IDPs, often represented by NGOs.43 In 2004, 
after deciding a number of these tutelas, the Court declared a state of 
unconstitutional conditions.44 This declaration was based on the Court’s 
conclusion that the population affected by displacement was very large–far 
too large to aid through individual orders–and that the problems affecting 
that population were structural in nature, stemming from deficiencies in 
both the budgetary resources and bureaucratic capacity of the state.45 As a 
result of this declaration, the Court maintained jurisdiction over the case and 
issued sweeping structural orders demanding that the state resolve a 
confluence of problems involving IDPs, including their access to emergency 
aid, housing, healthcare, job training, and other basic social rights, as well as 
reparations for their losses and a possible right of return.46 Subsequently, it 
has held regular public hearings, commissioned reports on compliance from 
the administration and other state and non-state actors, and issued a huge 
number of follow-up orders on many aspects of this massive social 
                                                             
39 Ana Maria Ibañez & Carlos Eduardo Velez, Civil Conflict and Forced Migration: The Micro 
Determinants and Welfare Losses of Displacement in Colombia, 36 WORLD DEV  659, 661 (2008)  
40 See UNHCR, supra note 38, at 57 tbl 1  
41 Manuel Jose Cepeda Espinosa, The Constitutional Protection of IDPs in Colombia, in JUDICIAL 
PROTECTION OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS: THE COLOMBIAN EXPERIENCE 1, 5 (Rodolfo 
Arango Rivadeneira, ed , 2009), available at https://www brookings edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/11_judicial_protection_arango pdf  
42 A law was passed giving various rights to IDPs (Law 387 of 1997), but this law was not being 
effectively implemented  See id. at 7  The Court’s decision emphasized the state’s ultimate accountability 
for IDPs even if it was not the sole cause of the problem  In this sense, the opinion sounds in broader 
notions of state accountability even for non-state action, which as Teitel notes is a common feature of 
constitutionalism during transitional justice  See Rudi G  Teitel, Transitional Justice and the Transformation 
of Constitutionalism, in GLOBALIZING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 181, 191–96 
(2016)  
43 See Cepeda Espinosa, supra note 41, at 9 (noting that the Court had reviewed over 100 
individual tutelas involving IDPs by 2004)  
44 See Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], enero 22, 2004, Sentencia T-025/04, § 
III 7  
45 See id.  
46 See id. § III 10 1  
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problem.47 These orders have not overcome the existence of a large-scale 
structural problem with IDPs, but they have ensured a substantial and more 
coherent response by the state. The state now maintains a relatively 
functional process by which IDPs can register with the state, and those on 
the list receive a range of social benefits.48 The Court’s orders led to a much 
larger budget for IDP assistance and a larger, more coordinated 
bureaucracy.49 
This case has been extensively analyzed by scholars, largely as an 
example of the potential of a structural remedy for widespread social rights 
violations.50 Even if the order has not been successful in all its aspirations, 
scholars have viewed it as exercising a transformative impact on public 
policy towards IDPs.51 As noted by Rodriguez Garavito, the overarching 
remedial approach has been robust but flexible.52 That is, the Court has 
undertaken a labor-intensive monitoring process through reports and 
hearings, and has used follow-up orders to adjust the meaning of compliance 
through time. At the same time, the overall shape of the remedy is dialogical; 
the shape of public policy on IDPs has not been imposed by the Court but 
rather has emerged in discussions between the Court, the state bureaucracy, 
civil society groups, and independent state checking institutions.53 In other 
words, the chief role of the Court has been to use mechanisms to ensure 
that the state was taking adequate account of different problems faced by 
the IDP population as a whole or of its subgroups, thus pressuring the state 
to provide solutions through a process of dialogue. 
It is worth emphasizing the way that the Court carefully constructed and 
relied upon international law in its jurisprudence. The decision declaring a 
state of unconstitutional conditions contained an extensive discussion of 
international law, particularly the Guiding Principles for the treatment of 
                                                             
47 See César Rodríguez Garavito & Diana Rodríguez-Franco, RADICAL DEPRIVATION ON TRIAL: 
THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH 41–42 
(2015) (describing the monitoring process in detail)  
48 See id. at 36  
49 See id. at 53 (pointing out a large budgetary increase since T-025); Cepeda-Espinosa, supra note 
41, at 36–37  
50 See, e.g., Cesar Rodriguez Garavito, Beyond the Courtroom: The Impact of Judicial Activism on 
Socioeconomic Rights in Latin America, 89 TEX  L  REV  1669 (2011) (suggesting that monitoring 
mechanisms were the key to the success of socioeconomic rights remedies); David Landau, The Reality 
of Social Rights Enforcement, 53 HARV  INT’L L  J  189 (2012) (arguing that the decision represents a 
structural strategy for social rights enforcement that is likely to be superior to other approaches at 
reaching the poor); KATHARINE G  YOUNG, CONSTITUTING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 196–
97 (2012) (exploring the T-025 as part of a “managerial” and “peremptory” conception of role)  
51 See Rodriguez-Garavito & Rodriguez-Franco, supra note 47 (arguing that the decision had a 
wide range of material and symbolic effects)  
52 See Rodriguez Garavito, supra note 50, at 16 (arguing that the Court’s approach was consistent 
with dialogic forms of judicial review)  
53 See id. (noting that the implementation process for T-025 “set broad goals and clear 
implementation paths through deadlines and progress reports, while leaving substantive decisions and 
detailed outcomes to government agencies”)  
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IDPs that were produced by the UNHCR.54 These guidelines are a version 
of international “soft law” without directly binding effect. However, the 
Court used them as its key source for the establishment of international 
standards protecting the population. The guidelines helped establish the list 
of rights to which IDPs would be entitled across different areas, including 
protection from displacement, protection and humanitarian assistance while 
displaced, and reparations, return, and resettlement.55 Both the Court’s 
initial orders and follow-up orders relied heavily on the Guidelines as a 
template for defining the different areas in which judicial involvement was 
necessary. 
The monitoring process for the IDP decision has also featured 
substantial international involvement. The UNHCR has regularly produced 
reports for the Court, disseminated information about the judgment and its 
follow-up orders, and rendered assistance to IDPs.56 Moreover, its ex-
representative in Colombia has served as a member of the civil society 
Monitoring Commission (along with domestic civil society groups and 
former members of the Court) that has played a major role in developing 
policy proposals and monitoring compliance with the judgment. In the 
monitoring process, as Guzman Duque shows, the Guiding Principles have 
played not only a legal role as a source of authority but also a political role 
as a basis for organizing and presenting claims and duties: civil society 
groups representing IDPs have framed claims in their terms, and both the 
state bureaucracy implementing judicial orders and institutions charged with 
monitoring compliance have organized and evaluated implementation 
through its lens.57 In effect, the Guiding Principles filled a normative 
vacuum. In the absence of clear domestic standards for IDPs, the Guiding 
Principles have allowed both the Court and a range of other actors to point 
towards a source of relatively detailed guidance. 
 
 
 
                                                             
54 See UNCHR, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, E/CN 4/1998/53/Add 2, 11 
February 1998  T-025 was not the first time the Court has relied on the Guidelines  In prior tutelas 
involving IDPs, it had already stated that the Guidelines should be used as parameters for interpreting 
and implementing constitutional rights  See Federico Guzmán Duque, The Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement: Judicial Incorporation and Subsequent Application in Colombia, in JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF 
INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS: THE COLOMBIAN EXPERIENCE 175, 177–82 (Rodolfo Arango 
Rivadeneira, ed , 2009), available at https://www brookings edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/11_judicial_protection_arango pdf  The Guidelines were also included as 
an appendix to the Court’s decision  See Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], enero 22, 
2004, Sentencia T-025/04, annex 3  
55 See Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], enero 22, 2004, Sentencia T-025/04, § 
5 2  
56 See, e.g., Rodriguez Garavito & Rodriguez Franco, supra note 47, at 114 (giving an example of 
the involvement of the UNHCR in the monitoring process)  
57 See Guzman Duque, supra note 54, at 191–96; 198–201  
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B. The Rights of Victims of Internal Armed Conflict During the Peace Process 
 
The ongoing peace process in Colombia has also been heavily 
influenced by the discourse of victims as a protected class under 
international law. Perhaps unusually, the peace process has been undertaken 
within the framework of the existing 1991 Constitution through laws and 
amendments to its text, rather than via construction of a wholly new 
constitutional document.58 This has given the Court the opportunity to use 
existing interpretations of constitutional provisions, such as article 93, to 
shape the process. It has also raised an important conundrum that the Court 
has usually managed skillfully—how to insist the rights of victims are 
adequately accounted for during the peace process without making the 1991 
Constitution too rigid a text to play a transitional justice role. 
From its early decisions, the Court made clear that it would enforce 
article 93 in order to ensure that legal frameworks for waging the internal 
armed conflict were compliant with international humanitarian law.59 This 
has given the Court tools to shape the peace process to account for the 
interests of victims. The Court has emphasized the constitutional 
importance of peace, which was one of the driving motives behind the 
writing of the 1991 Constitution and is enshrined as both a right and a duty 
in the text.60 It has explicitly endorsed a framework of transitional justice, 
holding that the cause of ending the conflict justifies concessions to illegal 
armed groups and the use of a broad flexible set of tools, beyond an 
exclusive focus on criminal justice.61 But it has also held that peace 
agreements must not ignore victims’ rights. For example, it has insisted that 
combatants who have committed certain classes of serious crimes may not 
escape justice entirely, and it has also emphasized the rights of victims to 
receive the truth about the crimes committed against them and reparations 
for those wrongs, paid either by the violators or the state. 
In 2005, the government passed the Law of Justice and Peace, which 
created a demobilization process for paramilitary groups and offered them 
significant reductions in criminal penalties in exchange for the group’s 
demobilization and disarmament.62 Any reduction in penalties were 
                                                             
58 See Rudi G  Teitel, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 197–201 (2000)  
59 See, e.g., Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], mayo 18, 1995, Sentencia C-225/95 
§II 12 (upholding the ratification by Colombia of Protocol II to the Geneva Convention on internal 
armed conflict, and emphasizing the importance of article 93 in “harmonizing” international law with 
principles of constitutional supremacy); Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], abril 25, 
2007, Sentencia C-291/07 (striking down some provisions of domestic criminal law relevant to the 
internal armed conflict on the grounds that they were inconsistent with international humanitarian law)  
60 See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C P ] art  22  
61 See Teitel, supra note 58 (arguing that accounts of transitional justice should move beyond 
simply prioritizing individual accountability through criminal law)  
62 See L  975/05, julio 25, 2005, DIARIO OFICIAL [D O ], available at 
http://www secretariasenado gov co/senado/basedoc/ley_0975_2005 html  
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contingent on a full confession by the paramilitary actor as to all crimes for 
which he was responsible, and full cooperation with the process of finding 
the truth of unresolved atrocities committed by these groups.63 For even the 
most serious offenses, violators would serve only between five and eight 
years in prison, and some of this time—such as time spent in special 
demobilized zones—could be counted towards the penalty.64 While many 
commentators saw the law as a step towards peace, others criticized it as 
allowing war criminals to evade justice.65  
The Court upheld the basic core of the law but struck down some 
provisions and imposed conditions on other aspects of it.66 The Court’s 
decision barred the state from granting amnesty for certain serious crimes 
under international law and reiterated that any benefit given should respect 
the rights of victims to pursue truth, justice, and reparations.67 The Court 
also struck down the provisions allowing time in demobilized zones to be 
counted as criminal punishment, and imposed conditions requiring that 
both the state and the paramilitaries put forth greater resources to ensure 
reparations for victims of the conflict.68 Thus, the Court allowed the state 
to negotiate with illegal armed groups in service of the constitutional value 
of peace, but regulated the nature and extent of concessions made towards 
these groups, consistent with their understanding of international law. 
Similar concepts have played a role in the more recent negotiation of 
peace with the FARC and other left-wing guerrilla groups. To facilitate 
peace talks that were just beginning in 2012, the government passed the 
Legal Framework for Peace as a set of temporary constitutional articles 
intended to facilitate the peace process.69 The Legal Framework for Peace 
empowered the Congress to adopt a special law that would give concessions 
in the criminal punishments given to members of illegal armed groups who 
entered into peace agreements. The law would: 
 
…determine selection criteria that will permit the concentration of 
resources of criminal investigation on the top-level actors responsible 
for all the crimes constituting crimes against humanity, genocide, or 
                                                             
63 See id. 
64 See id. 
65 See, e.g., Debate: Esta fracasando la Ley de Justicia y Paz?, SEMANA (July 28, 2007), 
http://www semana com/nacion/articulo/esta-fracasando-ley-justicia-paz/87297-3  
66 See Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], mayo 18, 2006, Sentencia C-370/06  
67 See id. § 4 4  
68 See id. § 6 2 3 3 (time spent in demobilized zones); § 6 2 4 (reparations)  
69 See L  1/12, julio 31, 2012, DIARIO OFICIAL [D O ] available at 
http://wsp presidencia gov co/Normativa/actos-
legislativos/Documents/2012/ACTO%20LEGISLATIVO%20N%C2%B0%2001%20DEL%2031
%20DE%20JULIO%20DE%202012 pdf; Acuerdo Final para la terminacion del conflict y la 
construccion de una paz estable y duradera, Nov  24, 2016, available at 
https://www mesadeconversaciones com co/sites/default/files/24-1480106030 11-
1480106030 2016nuevoacuerdofinal-1480106030 pdf  
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war crimes committed in a systematic manner; establish the cases, 
requisites, and conditions in which punishments may be suspended, 
establish the cases in which extrajudicial sanctions, alternative 
punishments, or special modes of executing or complying with 
punishments may be applied; and authorize the conditional 
renunciation of criminal justice in all of the non-selected cases…70  
 
The amendment also set up other instruments of transitional justice by 
calling for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission that would work on non-
criminal forms of justice. Petitioners challenged the italicized language in the 
amendment, arguing that it violated fundamental precepts of international 
humanitarian and human rights law by allowing prosecutors to ignore crimes 
other than those conducted by “top-level” actors and which were not 
conducted in a “systematic manner.”71 
The Court’s decision reviewing the Legal Framework for Peace is 
striking because it was conducted as a review of constitutional amendments, 
not ordinary legislation. The Court thus used a super-strong form of judicial 
review that it had previously developed to hold some constitutional 
amendments unconstitutional.72 Under the Court’s substitution of the 
constitutional doctrine, proposed constitutional changes can themselves be 
unconstitutional if they would replace fundamental principles of the existing 
constitution.73 This decision was recognized by both the Court and the 
political branches as one of extraordinary importance. For example, during 
the Court’s public audience reviewing the law, President Juan Manuel Santos 
himself came to the Court to plead for the law’s constitutionality. In his 
words, the moment represented “a real possibility, in my opinion the best 
in our history, to put an end to the internal armed conflict.”74 
The Court upheld the Legal Framework for Peace, but it also imposed 
a set of significant conditions on its implementation. The Court’s ruling 
emphasized the flexible nature of international law during a regime of 
transitional justice. At the same time, it held that through article 93, certain 
                                                             
70 L  1/12, julio 31, 2012, art  1, DIARIO OFICIAL [D O ] (emphasis added)  
71 See Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], agosto 28, 2013, Sentencia C-579/13  
72 This doctrine is not unique to Colombia, but in fact exists in a number of countries found in 
regions around the world  See Yaniv Roznai, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments—The Migration 
and Success of a Constitutional Idea, 61 AM  J  COMP  L  657 (2013)  
73 Only a Constituent Assembly, wielding its original constituent power to replace the 1991 
Constitution, is empowered to make changes of that magnitude  See Bernal Pulido, supra note 26, at 
341–46 (describing the historical development of the doctrine); Rosalind Dixon and David Landau, 
Transnational Constitutionalism and a Limited Doctrine of Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment, 13 INT’L 
J  CONST  L  606, 615–18 (2015) (explaining the utility of the doctrine in stopping President Alvaro 
Uribe from seeking a third consecutive term in office)  
74 Juan Manuel Santos, Intervención del Presidente Juan Manuel Santos en la Audiencia Pública 
del Marco Jurídico para la Paz, July 25, 2013, available at 
http://wsp presidencia gov co/Prensa/2013/Julio/Paginas/20130725_03-Palabras-Intervencion-
Presidente-Juan-Manuel-Santos-Audiencia-Publica-Marco-Juridico-para-la-Paz aspx  
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core protections of international humanitarian law and international human 
rights law not only were incorporated into the Constitution but also 
constituted fundamental principles of the constitutional order that could not 
be altered even by a constitutional amendment. The Court in particular 
derived a “fundamental pillar” of the Constitution—“the promise…to 
respect, protect, and guarantee the rights of society and of victims, from 
which is derived: the obligation to investigate, judge, and in turn sanction 
grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.”75 
The Court allowed a system of prioritization on “top-level actors” 
committing the most serious crimes under international law, even if this 
meant that some lower-level actors complicit in these crimes would likely 
not be prosecuted.76 It also endorsed the amendment’s multifaceted focus 
on a number of tools of transitional justice, including not only criminal law 
but also tools like a truth and reconciliation commission, and it gave the 
state broad discretion to choose the quantity and mode of any criminal 
punishment applied.77 However, the Court required increased transparency 
for decisions made to prioritize certain crimes and actors and required that 
victims have avenues to challenge those decisions.78 It also demanded that 
the perpetrators of crimes make a full recounting of their circumstances and 
the nature of their crimes, that the state provide sufficient resources to carry 
out thorough investigations even with respect to actors where prosecutions 
are not pursued, and that victims receive reparations from wrongdoers and 
the state.79 The decision thus allowed the state to prioritize the tools of 
criminal justice in a rational manner, but required an emphasis on the rights 
of victims to truth and reparations in all cases.80 
The government ultimately chose to pursue peace with the FARC using 
an approach that built on the Legal Framework for Peace, but also deviated 
from it in key respects. In June 2016, the government signed a definitive 
peace agreement with the FARC, and Congress passed a new set of 
                                                             
75 See Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], agosto 28, 2013, Sentencia C-579/13, § 
III 5 4  
76 See id. § III 8 3 2 iv  
77 See id. § III 6  
78 See id. § III 8 4 2  
79 See id. § III 8 4 3, III 8 4 5–6  
80 In a separate decision, the Court considered article 3 of the constitutional reform, which gave 
the Congress broad powers to delineate offenses as political and thus to avoid imposing as a penalty 
loss of rights of political participation, with the exception of “crimes against humanity and genocide 
committed in a systematic manner” where such rights could not be restored  See L  1, julio 31, 2012, 
art  3, DIARIO OFICIAL [D O ]  The Court upheld the constitutional amendment against a charge that 
it substituted the constitution by arguing that international law placed fewer restrictions on rights of 
political participation than on ordinary criminal justice  See Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional 
Court], agosto 6, 2014, Sentencia C-577/14  
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temporary constitutional amendments facilitating the peace process.81 These 
new amendments gave the president special decree powers on issues relating 
to the peace process, created a special fast-track procedure for the approval 
of laws and constitutional amendments related to this process, and stated 
that the peace agreement itself would become part of the “constitutional 
block” once it was signed and had gone into force.82 
The drafting and approval of the final peace agreement and its 
associated constitutional provisions reflected the shaping done by the 
Constitutional Court and engaged in a kind of dialogue with international 
law limits noted by the Court. The initial agreement finalized in 2016 was 
widely seen as conscious of international law but as stretching the limits of 
the flexibility in a transitional justice framework.83 For example, it required 
that members of guerrilla groups who committed the most serious crimes 
of international law, such as crimes against humanity and grave war crimes, 
be criminally punished by a Special Jurisdiction for peace; but, it 
contemplated alternatives to prison involving “effective restriction of 
freedom” for those convicted, which some argued was “amnesty by another 
name.”84 
The initial agreement was narrowly defeated in a referendum, largely 
because of concerns that it deemphasized the rights of victims and let the 
worst members of the FARC go unpunished. The president and the FARC 
then renegotiated the agreement by making modest changes to the text, such 
as giving the Constitutional Court potential review powers over the special 
tribunal, broadening the responsibility of higher-ranking officers for the 
actions of their subordinates, and increasing the requirements on FARC 
guerrillas to forfeit assets for reparation funds.85 This Court continues to 
review aspects of the peace process.86 For example, in November 2017, the 
                                                             
81 See L  1/16, julio 7, 2016, DIARIO OFICIAL [D O] available at 
http://es presidencia gov co/normativa/normativa/ACTO%20LEGISLATIVO%2001%20DEL%2
07%20DE%20JULIO%20DE%202016 pdf  
82 The fast track procedure would be in effect for six months and could be extended for another 
six months by the president  See id. art  1  The amendment also provided that the agreement would 
constitute a “special agreement” under international humanitarian law  See id. 
83 See, e.g., Claret Vargas, The Peace Agreement in Colombia Matters, and it Could Set an Example for 
Entrenched Conflicts Elsewhere, GLOBAL RIGHTS BLOG, Feb  9, 2016, at 
https://dejusticiablog com/2016/02/09/the-peace-agreement-in-colombia-matters-and-it-could-set-
an-example-for-entrenched-conflicts-elsewhere/  
84 See id. 
85 See Los puntos clave del nuevo acuerdo de paz con las Farc, EL PAIS (Nov  12, 2016), 
http://www elpais com co/elpais/colombia/proceso-paz/noticias/puntos-clave-nuevo-acuerdo-paz-
con-farc  
86 Other recent major cases have dealt with constitutional and procedural issues not directly 
related to the rights of victims  See, e.g., Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], mayo 22, 
2017, Sentencia C-332/17 (striking down parts of constitutional amendments allowing laws to receive 
fast-track consideration); Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], julio 18, 2016, Sentencia 
C-379/16 (considering and upholding the core of the law authorizing a referendum to approve the 
final peace agreement between the government and the FARC)  
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Court upheld most of the temporary constitutional amendments that 
created the special peace jurisdiction.87 However, it imposed some 
important clarifications, again holding that ex-combatants would lose all of 
the criminal and political participation benefits of the special system if they 
did not cooperate fully in the process by, among other things, telling the full 
truth about their acts and contributing to their reparations after fully 
disclosing their assets.88 The Court also struck down parts of the 
amendment, for example those that would have limited the review of the 
Court over the special jurisdiction,89 and those which would have restricted 
the normal powers of the national Inspector General to intervene in cases 
in order to protect the rights of victims to situations where he or she was 
invited by a judge of that jurisdiction.90 
In short, the Court has used standards found in international law to 
create a protected class of victims from the country’s internal armed conflict 
and to give them claims not only to socioeconomic goods, but also to 
reparations for the wrongs done to them and a right to know the truth about 
those events and to pursue justice against the perpetrators. The Court’s 
strategy in this area has combined two key elements. First, it has relied 
heavily on the authority of international law. Given the premium the 1991 
Constitution placed on recasting Colombia as a “good” democratic state in 
the world order, it seems likely that these invocations have had significant 
normative force, and the Court’s efforts would have been less successful 
without them. 
Second, the Court’s use of international law has been strategic and 
flexible in nature, and has included an extensive process of translation 
between the international and the domestic. Although the Court has relied 
heavily on international law as a source of authority, the process has been 
richer than a merely passive incorporation of international law. By wrestling 
with international standards in a serious way, the Court has dialogued not 
only with the political branches regarding public policy but also with the 
content of international law itself. At times the Court has given additional 
force to provisions that were not clearly binding under international law as 
a way to fill normative gaps and to ensure accountability: the UNHCR 
Guiding Principles for Internal Forced Displacement offer an example. 
During the peace process, in contrast, the Court emphasized the flexibility 
of international legal standards and the fact that they were consistent with a 
wide range of solutions to the internal armed conflict.91 The Court’s goal, in 
                                                             
87 Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], noviembre 14, 2017, Sentencia C-674/17 
88 See id.  
89 These provisions would have required judges of the special jurisdiction to approve any review 
of decisions via tutela by the Constitutional Court  See id. 
90 See id. 
91 See Carlos Bernal Pulido, Transitional Justice within the Framework of a Permanent Constitution: The 
Case Study for the Legal Framework for Peace in Colombia, 3 CAMBRIDGE J  COMP  & INT’L L  1136 (2014)  
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other words, seems to be to make the political process cognizant of the 
rights of victims of the conflict, rather than forcing the state to adhere to a 
particular substantive approach. 
IV. THE PROMISE AND LIMITS OF THE COURT’S APPROACH 
 
This article argues that the Court used the international law provisions 
of the Colombian Constitution of 1991 to construct a discourse that 
protected the victims of internal armed conflict. In so doing, it adopted a 
stance that was consistent with the overall orientation of the Constitution, 
which was designed to harness international law as a way to ameliorate a 
domestic crisis of legitimacy. 
It is worth analyzing the Court’s rich jurisprudence from three distinct 
comparative perspectives. The first is the general frame of judicialization of 
sensitive, politicized issues: judicial interventions in a peace process raises 
obvious risks. I argue that the Court has usually managed to limit these risks 
through jurisprudence that is flexible, essentially emphasizing the 
importance of the rights of victims without putting political actors in a 
straightjacket. The second frame emphasizes the impact of intervention on 
the vulnerable group. While aggressive judicial enforcement of the rights of 
groups could and at times has accentuated a logic of “otherness,” for the 
most part the Court has successfully drawn on a logic of solidarity that has 
greatly deepened engagement with victim’s rights within the political system. 
However, this very success suggests a limit on the replicability of the Court’s 
approach in situations involving true outsiders such as refugees. The logic 
of solidarity that justifies the Court’s activism may not exist vis-à-vis outsider 
populations. Indeed, as I show below, the Court’s limited and more 
deferential jurisprudence on outsider groups such as asylum-seekers stands 
in some contrast to its aggressive protections for the victims of internal 
armed conflict. 
 
A. Avoiding the Downside of Judicialization 
 
An obvious potential problem of allowing judicial intervention in 
something as delicate and highly politicized as the peace process is that it 
may pose risks to both the institution of the Constitutional Court and the 
peace process itself. Precisely because the Court has constructed so many 
tools of intervention in legislation and even constitutional amendments 
related to the peace process, it poses an unusual threat to the legal stability 
of that process. Unsurprisingly, then, the scope of intervention in the peace 
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process played a central role in this year’s elections of new magistrates to 
the Court.92 
The Court has usually been cognizant of these risks. Its interventions in 
the Law of Justice and Peace and the Legal Framework for Peace stressed 
the rights of victims without overruling the basic approach taken by political 
actors. Its emphasis on flexibility, while maintaining a sense of limits, is an 
attempt to guide political discourse without placing it in a straightjacket. 
Bernal notes, for example, that in the Legal Framework for Peace case, the 
Court made an important change in its jurisprudence on the 
unconstitutional constitutional amendment doctrine by allowing 
balancing.93 It recognized that even major changes to constitutional 
principles, which might otherwise be struck down, can be permissible if in 
service of other fundamental constitutional principles such as peace. 
Moreover, in carrying out this balancing, the Court considered not only the 
domestic constitution but also the goals of international law in a regime of 
transitional justice via article 93.94 In the Law of Peace and Justice case, the 
Court also explicitly balanced between the rights of victims and the 
constitutional value of peace.95 
The Court has also read international law itself as a relatively—although 
not completely—flexible system.96 The majority of the Court in the Legal 
Framework for Peace case, for example, allowed constitutional changes that 
prioritized criminal justice being wielded against the highest-level actors 
committing the most serious crimes such as crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, and genocide, against the dissent’s view that would have required 
such crimes to be prosecuted regardless of an actor’s place in the hierarchy 
or level of responsibility.97 The majority justified its view in light of the 
inherently flexible nature of transitional justice, as well as the nature of the 
conflict in Colombia and resource constraints on enforcement.98 
                                                             
92 See, e.g., El 10 de mayo el Senado elegirá a dos magistrados de la Corte Constitucional, EL ESPECTADOR 
(Apr  18, 2017) at http://www elespectador com/noticias/judicial/senado-le-pone-fecha-eleccion-de-
dos-magistrados-de-la-corte-constitucional-articulo-689907  
93 See Pulido, supra note 91, at 1153  
94 See id. at 1152–53  
95 See Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], mayo 18, 2006 Sentencia C-370/06 § 5  
96 In this sense, the majority’s approach is consistent with leading theories of transitional justice, 
which emphasize the need for accountability but maintain a number of different ways for a 
constitutional and legal orders to achieve these goals, and which emphasize that criminal justice should 
be understood differently during transitional moments  See Teitel, supra note 58  
97 See Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], agosto 28, 2013 Sentencia C-579/13, 
Gonzalez Cuervo, J , dissenting (arguing that the provisions violated the “minimum obligation” of 
states under international law to investigate and punish certain grave violation of human rights and 
international humanitarian law committed “under any rank”)  
98 See Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], agosto 28, 2017, Sentencia C-579/13 § 
8 3 2 (justifying the amendment as a response to a context where it was impossible to proceed case-by-
case as in ordinary criminal justice and where it was important to clarify the underlying “macro-
criminal” structure of the crimes)  
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The Colombian experience thus suggests that judicialization of a peace 
process may improve outcomes without threatening stability, so long as it is 
undertaken in a certain way. The key is not the extent of judicialization, but 
instead the timing and nature of the Court’s interventions. One could, of 
course, question whether the Court has been too flexible, allowing the state 
to underplay the rights of victims too much. But in this context, the political 
risks of decisions can be severe.  
Take, for example, the Court’s 2017 decision striking down parts of 
temporary constitutional amendments that created a congressional “fast 
track” procedure to ease passage of new laws and constitutional 
amendments related to the peace process.99 It held that parts of this 
amendment that required provisions to be voted on as a block,100 without 
the opportunity for further revision in the absence of executive approval,101 
were unconstitutional because they clashed with core constitutional values 
related to democratic deliberation. The decision only gave legislative 
members the ability to make changes to the executive’s proposals during 
congressional deliberations without executive consent, while leaving other 
aspects of the fast-track procedure intact.102 For example, fast-track 
proposals related to the peace process must still receive priority on the 
congressional floor103 and can still be approved with reduced procedural 
requirements.104  
Nonetheless, the FARC stated that the decision had “put the peace 
process in the most difficult situation it has lived since its start.”105 Members 
of the government also denounced the decision and sought its nullification, 
arguing that it made it more difficult for the government to use a key 
procedural tool for the implementation of peace. Any piece of legislation or 
amendment related to the peace process now faced the possibility of 
unraveling on the congressional floor. The decision thus illustrates the 
extremely delicate nature of judicial interventions related to peace. 
 
 
                                                             
99 See Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], mayo 22, 2017, Sentencia C-332/17  
100 See L  1/16, art  1(j), julio 7, 2016, DIARIO OFICIAL [D O] available at 
http://es presidencia gov co/normativa/normativa/ACTO%20LEGISLATIVO%2001%20DEL%2
07%20DE%20JULIO%20DE%202016 pdf  
101 See id. art  1(h)  
102 In fact, these aspects of the procedure had been upheld in an earlier decision  See Corte 
Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], diciembre 13, 2016, Sentencia C-699/16  
103 See supra note 100, art  1(b)  
104 For both legislation and constitutional amendments related to the peace process, committee 
debates can be undertaken in joint session between the House and Senate, while floor debates must be 
conducted separately  Furthermore, constitutional amendments can be approved in one legislative 
session rather than the normal two  See id. art  1(d), (f)  
105 Fallo de la Corte sobre acuerdo pone a prueba a mayorías del Congreso, EL TIEMPO (May 19, 2017), at 
http://www eltiempo com/politica/congreso/sentencia-de-la-corte-pone-a-las-farc-a-repensar-
tiempos-de-la-paz-89872  
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B. Building Solidarity vs. Accentuating “Otherness” 
 
Another theoretical danger of the Court’s approach is that it could 
heighten a sense of privileged “otherness” for the particular social groups 
affected by displacement or otherwise victimized by the conflict. The Court 
has provided a number of protections, especially economic protections, to 
these groups. As noted above, the Court has held that IDPs are entitled to 
emergency economic assistance, as well as a range of other benefits, such as 
assistance with housing and job placement.106 It has also held that the 
broader class of victims of internal armed conflict is entitled to reparations 
from armed groups or from the state for the harm they faced. Some political 
actors have hinted at a critique that these actors are receiving unfair 
advantages over other citizens, frequently with the help of fraud. State actors 
have at times resisted compliance by claiming that individuals are falsely 
registering as IDPs or falsely seeking reparations, and the Court has had to 
monitor these processes to ensure that undue obstacles are not placed on 
them.107 In the context of broad scarcity and widespread poverty, there 
might be some danger that these critiques could stick and lead to backlash 
against victimized populations. 
Over time, however, a more optimistic story based on solidarity has won 
out. Political actors have increasingly tended to recognize the rights of these 
groups, effectively incorporating discourses about IDPs and victims into 
politics. The Court’s main discursive weapon in these disputes, which is seen 
most clearly in the main IDP decision from 2004, is to identify IDPs and 
victims as deserving citizens who deserve recognition and support from the 
state but who have not received it as a result of lack of political will and 
bureaucratic incompetence. The Court’s decisions in these areas have thus 
worked in part by rendering invisible (and shameful) failures by the 
Colombian state more visible. Rodriguez-Garavito and Rodriguez-Franco, for 
example, argue that the IDP decision led to a significant increase in the quality 
of press coverage of displacement.108 Moreover, decisions championing the 
rights of vulnerable and seemingly deserving groups put the state in a difficult 
rhetorical position. The state may seek to drag its feet on compliance, of 
course, but the Court has faced little direct pushback on its goals. Some 
scholars have argued that the IDP decision itself should be understood as a 
strategic response to a difficult political context where judicial interventions 
on more conflictual issues would have threatened the Court as an 
                                                             
106 See supra Part III A  
107 See, e.g., Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], abril 25, 2013, Sentencia SU-
254/13 (holding that the state must pay the amount of reparations set in the law to registered IDPs 
and could not use common excuses to pay the reparations, such as that the registered IDPs may not 
actually be victims or that reparations should be set off against other payments to IDPs such as 
emergency economic aid or housing assistance)  
108 See Rodriguez-Garavito & Rodriguez-Franco, supra note 47, at 130–35  
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institution.109 The Court instead was able to make progress on areas where it 
could draw on a broad consensus and essentially force the executive’s hand.110 
A key moment of political incorporation of the Court’s agenda was the 
Law of Victims and the Restitution of Land, passed in 2011.111 The law 
adopted the Court’s framing of those displaced or otherwise affected by the 
conflict as victims of internal armed conflict who are entitled to extensive 
protections under international law. Article 3 of the law defines victims as 
“those persons who individually or collectively have suffered harm for facts 
occurring after January 1, 1985, as a consequence of violations of 
international humanitarian law or grave and manifest violations of 
international human rights, occurring as a result of the internal armed 
conflict.”112 Many of the provisions of the law tracked the Court’s 
jurisprudence and pulled from international law to inform which benefits 
should be extended to IDPs. Others have given greater definition to rights 
that the Court has had difficulty enforcing on its own. For example, the law 
contemplated special legal processes to adjudicate the return of land that 
was improperly taken from IDPs, and it set amounts and other procedures 
to give them reparations from the state for the wrongs that were committed 
against them during the conflict.113 The law thus symbolically embraced the 
Court’s framing, although subsequent jurisprudence and struggles have 
taken place over the scope and implementation of the law.114 
The upshot, then, is that the Court has been fairly successful at 
constructing a political discourse of solidarity in which IDPs and other 
victims have been unfairly deprived of justice by the state. Rather than 
feeding a sense of otherness, its work has more commonly helped to create 
a sense of inclusion vis-à-vis these groups. 
 
C. A Replicable Strategy? Insiders vs. Outsiders 
 
The very logic of the Court’s success suggests that it may have less 
success in constructing an agenda focused on groups socially identified as 
                                                             
109 See Jorge González-Jácome, In Defense of Judicial Populism: Lessons from Colombia, INT’L J  
CONST  L , May 3, 2017, at: http://www iconnectblog com/2017/05/in-defense-of-judicial-populism-
lessons-from-colombia/  
110 See id. 
111 See L  1448/11, junio 10, 2011, DIARIO OFICIAL [D O ] at 
http://www secretariasenado gov co/senado/basedoc/ley_1448_2011 html  
112 Id. art  3  
113 See id. arts  9, 25  
114 See, e.g., Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], marzo 28, 2012, Sentencia C-
250/12 (upholding the temporal scope of the law as applying only to incidents after 1985 as a 
permissible exercise in legislative judgment); Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], 
octubre 10, 2012, Sentencia C-781/12 (upholding a provision limiting the law only to victims of 
“internal armed conflict,” but holding that that phrase must be understood in a “broad sense”); Corte 
Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], abril 24, 2013, Sentencia SU-254/13 (clarifying various 
aspects of the right to reparations created by the law)  
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“outsiders” rather than “insiders,” such as foreign refugees. The success of 
the Colombian story stems in part from a solidarity rhetoric: it was difficult 
for the state to oppose granting rights to Colombian victims of armed 
conflict. This kind of solidarity with domestic IDPs may be more difficult 
to achieve with respect to foreign refugees. Using international and domestic 
constitutional law to call attention to the plight of these groups may thus 
spark higher levels of active political resistance. 
There is some evidence for this distinction within Colombian 
constitutional law and politics. The Court’s extensive jurisprudence on the 
rights of victims inside Colombia stands in contrast to its scarcer and more 
permissive jurisprudence on refugees and others found outside of the 
country. The constitutional right to asylum, for example, is one of the less 
developed rights in the Colombian constitution. In those relatively few cases 
where it has been cited, the Court has given considerable deference to the 
political branches, although it has held that the right may be protected by 
tutela because it is fundamental in nature.115  
The Court’s broader jurisprudence on the rights of foreigners in 
Colombia is also fairly deferential. In Decision C-834 of 2007, for example, 
the Court considered a challenge to a provision of law that defined the 
system of social protection as being “the group of public policies oriented 
to diminishing the vulnerability and improving the quality of life of 
Colombians.”116 The challengers argued that the italicized phrase should be 
struck out or rewritten because the welfare system should be read to include 
foreigners resident in the country in light of article 100 of the Constitution, 
which gave resident foreigners the same civil rights as Colombians. The 
Court rejected the challenge. It noted that all people resident in the 
                                                             
115 See Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], agosto 14, 2003, Sentencia T-704/03  
The case involved an Iranian who had been caught with a false passport trying to board a flight to 
Miami, and who claimed political persecution  He was sentenced to an 18-month sentence for using 
false documents, and to be expelled from the country following that sentence  Towards the end of that 
criminal sentence (and thus several years after entering the country), the petitioner applied for asylum 
and was denied, with the authorities both casting doubt on his story and finding that he had applied in 
an improper manner by waiting several years to make the application  The Court upheld most of the 
decision taken against the petitioner  It vacated the administrative judgment on the narrow ground that 
the administrative actors had not made clear to the petitioner that he would have thirty days after that 
decision to legalize his immigration status (if possible), and that in no case could he be returned to the 
country—Iran—where he has stated that his life would be in danger (the administrative actors had 
already stated that they would not return him to Iran in any case)  The fairly limited case law on the 
rights of foreigners to seek asylum or refugee status is broadly consistent with T-704: the Court has 
adopted a position of substantial but not complete deference  See, e.g., Corte Constitutional [C C ] 
[Constitutional Court], abril 4, 2005, Sentencia T-32/05 (rejecting the claim of a Cuban applicant for 
asylum that he was being denied a right to a vital minimum level of subsistence, instead finding that he 
should be deported and that there were other countries willing to take him in); Corte Constitutional 
[C C ] [Constitutional Court], abril 26, 2017, Sentencia T-250/17 (upholding a decision by Colombian 
authorities to deny refugee status to a Venezuelan family, although reversing denial of work visa for 
denial of due process because it lacked adequate reasoning)    
116 See Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], octubre 10, 2007, Sentencia C-834/07 
(emphasis added)  
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country—whether Colombian or foreign—had a right to receive a “vital 
minimum” level of subsistence.117 However, beyond the vital minimum, the 
Court held that the legislature had a large “margin of configuration” as to 
how foreigners would be included in existing social safety nets.118 The Court 
has likewise been insistent in holding that provisions entitling foreigners to 
equal enjoyment of civil rights did not prohibit inequalities of treatment, so 
long as these were the result of “reasonable justification.”119 
Of course, Colombia historically has been an originating, rather than 
destination, country for foreign refugees. But the Venezuelan economic and 
political crisis has changed that dynamic, leading to an influx of more than 
half a million Venezuelans by the end of 2017, some coming for political 
reasons, and many more to flee economic catastrophe.120 The Colombian 
president has noted that the movement may be “the most serious problem” 
currently facing the country.121 The Constitutional Court has begun to 
decide a large number of cases involving Venezuelan plaintiffs: the recent 
volume has been sufficient for the president of the Constitutional Court to 
express “concern” in a public interview.122 The Court has maintained its line 
denying foreigners access to many health benefits while requiring that they 
receive at least a minimum level of services, and perhaps has begun slowly 
and cautiously building up a more expansive set of rights. 
For example, in Decision T-314 of 2016, the Court reiterated that 
foreigners irregularly present in the country had no right to accede to the 
national healthcare system.123 It thus denied a request by a Venezuelan to 
receive medicine and treatment for diabetes and held that his rights had not 
been violated because he had received emergency treatment in a hospital. It 
has also found that requiring Venezuelan children to possess documents 
                                                             
117 The “vital minimum” refers to the fundamental right to a level of subsistence necessary to 
live a dignified existence, which has been the centerpiece of the Court’s extensive jurisprudence on 
socioeconomic rights  For a discussion of the significance of the concept, see DAVID LANDAU, THE 
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122 See Con tutelas, venezolanos reclaman derecho a la salud, EL TIEMPO, Feb  19, 2018, at 
http://www eltiempo com/justicia/cortes/tutelas-de-venezolanos-para-pedir-proteccion-de-derecho-
a-la-salud-184294  
123 See Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], junio 26, 2016, Sentencia T-314/16  
See also Corte Constitutional [C C ] [Constitutional Court], diciembre 16, 2016, Sentencia T-728/16 
(denying tutela for foreign petitioner seeking to be placed on organ transplant waiting list)   
2018] THE VICTIMS OF INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT IN COLOMBIA 705 
attesting to legal status in order to attend school did not violate the 
constitution.124 
However, the Court also recently held that the healthcare system had to 
both provide prenatal care for an expectant Venezuelan mother and register 
her child in the system.125 Furthermore, the Court has protected petitioners 
in situations where the government put unnecessary barriers in immigration 
processes,126 and it has ordered the state to ensure that Venezuelans 
performing sex work in Colombia should not be deported en masse without 
adequate consideration of their individual circumstances.127 The latter 
decision, which ordered a place of prostitution to be reopened, occasioned 
harsh critiques that the Court had opened the door to massive migration of 
Venezuelan sex workers and migrants more generally.128  Public statements 
by the Court’s president on the Venezuelan crisis have emphasized the need 
to balance protection of rights with limited resources and the rights of 
Colombians to receive healthcare and other services.129 
The point here of course is not to argue that the influx of migrants from 
Venezuela poses the same problems, or imposes the same constitutional 
obligations, as Colombian IDPs or victims of the internal armed conflict. It 
is simply to suggest that the logic of solidarity that the Court has drawn upon 
in protecting internal victims may be more difficult to construct for the 
benefit of outsiders. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
This article has explored the Colombian Constitutional Court’s use of 
the internationalized orientation of the Constitution of 1991 to construct a 
robust but flexible set of rights for the victims of that country’s internal 
armed conflict. This achievement suggests several questions for 
comparative research. The first is about constitutional design. A key feature 
of the Constitution of 1991 is that it turned towards international law—
including provisions explicitly pointed towards outsiders, like the right to 
asylum—chiefly as a vehicle for resolving a crisis of order and legitimacy, 
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and an international image crisis, linked to an internal armed conflict. In 
other words, it turned outwards as a way to resolve an internal problem. 
Such an orientation does not seem to be unusual, especially in the global 
south. In South Africa, for example, constitutional drafters turned towards 
international law as a way to signal a changed state and to help ensure that 
the abuses of apartheid would not recur;130 in Mexico, reformers recently 
created a similar link in part to overcome a domestic human rights crisis 
linked to worsening violence.131 Designers may thus turn toward 
international law and the external aspects of constitutionalism chiefly for 
domestic reasons, and in these contexts international law may gain an 
enhanced power as a source of authority. 
A second comparative question is about the ways in which the different 
strategies of courts can improve the political and social response towards 
vulnerable populations like IDPs and refugees. The Court’s approach has 
been to draw on the authority of international law in a flexible way that 
forces the state to take account of the victims of internal armed conflict, but 
which also provides the state with a wide range of options for resolving that 
conflict. Whether such a strategy would work elsewhere, and whether the 
result would change if the beneficiaries are more clearly cast as outsiders 
rather than insiders, is a complex question. It may be possible for courts to 
use a similar logic for the benefit of foreign migrants even in poor countries, 
but the conditions under which such as strategy could work may be more 
stringent. The Colombian case suggests that analysts should look not only 
at the extent to which a constitution is turned towards the external, 
providing rights for asylum seekers and other actors, but also the reasons 
why such a turn has occurred. Moreover, judicial success may depend on 
legal, political, and social discourses that allow for the construction of 
solidarity with groups of “outsiders.”132 Further comparative analysis is thus 
needed to illuminate the extent to which elements of the Colombian 
constitutional strategy for victims of internal armed conflict are viable in 
distinct contexts, such as in refugee crises that cross international borders. 
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